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Abstract
The Federal Trade Commission recently exposed Whole Foods’ CEO John Mackey
for having made pseudonymous posts on financial message boards for over

SEARCH

seven years. Mackey’s practice of “sock puppeting,” or posting under a false
identity to praise and build support for one’s company, is becoming more
common among high-powered corporate executives who have few other outlets

>>

in which to vent their frustrations and spar with their critics. In July, the SEC
began an informal investigation into Mackey’s posts. This article examines the
liabilities sock puppeteers may face under current securities regulations,

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

particularly § 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation Fair
Disclosure (“FD”).
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INTRODUCTION
<1>For

nearly eight years, John Mackey, the CEO of Whole Foods Market, used a

pseudonym to make posts on Yahoo! financial message boards, promoting stock of
his supermarket chain and bashing competitor Wild Oats Markets, which Whole
Foods was bidding to acquire. 2 Mackey’s online comments are an example of a new
practice, known as “sock puppeting,” in which individuals post on message boards
under false identities to praise and build support for their own companies. 3 The
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in order to determine whether Mackey will
be held liable for his actions, is now informally investigating every word of the over
1,200 posts Mackey made from January 1999 to August 2006.4 This article will first
define the practice of sock puppeting and suggest why it has recently come under
scrutiny by the SEC. Next, the article will discuss possible liabilities for sock
puppeteers under securities law, including possible violations of both anti-fraud and
selective disclosure provisions. Finally, this article will address how the practice of
sock puppeting may impact securities law in the future. These issues will be
considered through the context of the recent exposure of John Mackey’s history of
pseudonymous posting.

SOCK PUPPETING AND THE SEC
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<2>“Sock

puppeting” is defined by the New York Times as “the act of creating a

fake online identity to praise, defend or create the illusion of support for one’s self,
allies or company.”5 Based on this definition, the practice of sock puppeting
appears to be an updated version of the “cybersmears” that haunted corporations
throughout the 1990s. 6 “Cybersmearing” has been defined as “the practice of
anonymously posting messages on the Internet through the use of message boards
and chat rooms, which assert disparaging, or even defamatory rumors or
statements about a company, its executives, or its stock.”7 “Cybersmearing”
received SEC attention when companies and investors began using it as a market
manipulation device. 8
<3>In

recent cases, sock puppeting appears to have distinguished itself from

cybersmearing by being used more as a means of bolstering one’s own company
than as a method of adversely affecting another company. Although stock prices
may be affected by this practice, the purpose of sock puppeting may center less on
manipulation of securities and more on building support for and defending one’s
company against critics.9 Regardless of the puppeteers’ precise intent, sock
puppeting is becoming a pertinent concern to corporations as it becomes a more
common practice among company executives.10 Paul Kedrosky, author of the blog
Infectious Greed, states he is “convinced this [Mackey’s behavior] is the tip of the
iceberg” when it comes to business people and sock puppeting. 11
<4>While

the temptation to make pseudonymous posts may be difficult for some

company leaders to resist, the practice could result in severe repercussions to both
the company and the individual if the sock puppeteer is exposed.12 Pseudonymous
posting can create liability through allegations of fraud, deceit, and market
manipulation. 13 It is imperative that the SEC begins to clarify the application of
securities laws, specifically §10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, to fraudulent
practices, such as sock puppeting, that have arisen out of recent technological
advances.14
<5>The

SEC has clarified some of the risks of sock puppeting. Namely, if the

statements made by corporate executives under pseudonyms are perceived by the
public to be insider information, securities markets and stock prices could be
inflated or deflated accordingly.15 Any false or misleading statements Mackey made
about either Whole Foods or Wild Oats could be regarded as an attempt to
manipulate either company’s stock, a clear violation of securities regulations. 16
Under the relevant securities laws, false or misleading statements by
pseudonymously posting CEOs could lead to financial and/or criminal liability. 17 The
SEC will likely be investigating Mackey’s posts for two main securities violations—
statements that include false information and statements that violate selective
disclosure statutes. 18

LIABILITY UNDER SECURITIES LAW
<6>While

many of Mackey’s posts will lead to little more than public humiliation, 19

posts that could be of legal significance, however, include predictions regarding the
stock performance of Whole Foods and Wild Oats.20 For example, Mackey wrote in
June 2006, “So long as Whole Foods same store sales are in double digits the next
2 quarters, the stock won’t trade below $50 per share (and probably not below
$60).” 21 Disparaging remarks by Mackey about Wild Oats will also likely be
scrutinized by the SEC, such as: “Whole Foods is systematically destroying their
[Wild Oats’] viability as a business—market by market, city by city,”22 and “[Wild
Oats] still stinks and remains grossly overvalued based on very weak fundamentals.
The stock is up now, but if it doesn't get sold in the next year or so it is going to
plummet back down. Wait and see.”23
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<7>Securities

law experts suggest that Mackey’s comments could violate securities

laws for a number of reasons. 24 These reasons fall into two major categories. First,
Mackey may be liable for making statements that qualify as fraud under §10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.25 The concealment of a CEO’s true identity
through use of a pseudonym may be an illegal misrepresentation in and of itself, or
could be considered an “omission of a material fact.”26 Second, Mackey may be
liable for acting in violation of Regulation FD or for other acts addressing issues of
selective disclosure.27 Many securities law experts believe Mackey’s posts were a
blatant attempt to manipulate stock prices. 28 However, the pseudonymous nature
of the posts will make it difficult to prove that others interpreted Rahodeb’s
statements as credible inside information that could be used when making decisions
regarding the purchase or sale of securities. 29

Fraud Under § 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
<8>The

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) was adopted to address the

problems of securities fraud and market manipulation. Various manipulative
practices were prohibited by the 1934 Act, which has been reasonably successful in
preventing the kind of widespread market manipulation that thrived in the 1920s. 30
The antifraud provision most commonly invoked from the Act is §10b-5, which has
the broadest reach.31 Section 10b-5 has been termed a “catch-all” anti-fraud
provision, prohibiting all manipulative or deceptive acts or devices in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities. 32 Specifically, §10b-5 provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 33
<9>In

order to be liable under §10b-5, a defendant must satisfy certain

requirements. First, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant must have acted
with “scienter,” or knowingly. 34 In addition, under §10b-5(b), a defendant’s
statement or omission must rise to the level of a “material fact.” In TSC Industries
v. Northway, the Supreme Court held that, “an omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote.”

35

Later, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, this standard was held to

apply in §10b-5 cases as well. 36
<10> The

SEC will likely be looking determine whether any of Mackey’s posts

contained false statements, statements contradicting previous company comments,
or overly optimistic “forward-looking statements” regarding Whole Foods’ future. 37
If any of Mackey’s posts contain false statements of material fact, connected to the
purchase or sale of securities, he could be held liable for any effects his
misstatements may have had on securities markets or investor actions. It may be
difficult to prove that Mackey deliberately attempted to manipulate the stock prices
of Whole Foods or a rival company.38 However, the scienter requirement of §10b-5
only necessitates a showing of recklessness, and there is likely to be sufficient
evidence that Mackey acted recklessly.39 The SEC will look to §10b-5 in considering
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whether Mackey’s statements constituted fraud or deceit, and whether a
“reasonable investor” may have relied on them in making securities decisions. 40
<11> Whether

or not the SEC will find Mackey liable under §10b-5(b) will depend on

whether any of his statements satisfy the materiality requirement. When Mackey
posted statements as Rahodeb, he omitted to state that he was the CEO of the
company he was praising. It can be argued that because Mackey used a
pseudonym, the market was unaware of his connection to inside information at
Whole Foods, and therefore had no reason to consider his statements “material.” 41
However, multiple participants on the Yahoo! message board suspected that Mackey
was behind the Rahodeb posts. 42 Rahodeb’s “extensive and informed opinions”
caused other participants to question, “Is Rahodeb an insider?”43 Mackey’s varying
responses to these inquiries could affect the SEC’s findings as well. In one of his
more brazen posts, Mackey asserted, “dcc7 has claimed that my true identity is
John Mackey. You can believe that one or not. Doesn't matter to me. If I really am
Mackey then I'm the ultimate insider at Whole Foods and you would be well served
to pay attention to what I have to say on this board.” 44 Posts questioning
Rahodeb’s identity, and Mackey’s response to these posts, provide support for the
argument that “reasonable investors” would have looked to him for inside
information that could be relied on in making decisions regarding the purchase or
sale of securities.

Selective Disclosures Under Regulation Fair Disclosure
<12> The

second category of potential liability for sock puppeteers involves a

violation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (“FD”), a regulation issued in 2000 to stop
company executives from intentional or unintentional “selective disclosure” of
information to favored shareholders or analysts. 45 Regulation FD does not prohibit
selective disclosure entirely, but rather requires companies that accidentally disclose
material nonpublic information to selective investors to reveal this information to
the entire public within twenty-four hours of the initial disclosure.46 Regulation FD
states:
“Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities . . .
the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information:
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.”47
<13> It

will be difficult to fit Mackey’s actions into the framework of Regulation FD,

since FD was created to prohibit selective disclosure to market professionals and
analysts, not message board forum investors. 48 However, one class of nonpublic
information recipients specified in the regulation are those that hold the issuer’s
securities, “under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the
person will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the
information.”49 It is likely that at least some of the message board investors
speaking with Mackey fall into the population this section of the rule describes. As
applied to Mackey, Regulation FD will require a three-part analysis. First, the SEC
will need to prove that Mackey’s posts disclosed material nonpublic information.50
The SEC will look to Mackey’s over 1,200 posts to determine whether any new
information was disclosed. As in the case of §10b-5, this analysis will likely hinge
on the issue of “materiality,” according to the standard set forth in TSC
Industries.51 Second, the Commission will need to prove that Mackey was viewed
as either “an issuer” or “any person acting on [the issuer’s] behalf.”52 It is a
distinct possibility that this could be shown, given Mackey’s position and forum
participants’ comments regarding Rahodeb’s extensive knowledge. 53 Third, to hold
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Mackey liable under Regulation FD, the SEC will need to prove that Whole Foods
knew or learned about the selective disclosure, and subsequently failed to
“promptly” disclose the information to the public. 54
<14> Since

Mackey used a pseudonym, it will be difficult to directly attribute the

posted information to Whole Foods Market. Although Mackey, as CEO, can certainly
be viewed as a spokesperson and agent of the company, violation occurs under
Regulation FD only when the company itself or a person acting on its behalf
selectively discloses the information or is complicit in its disclosure.55 While Mackey
surely exercised poor judgment, his posts were arguably not intended to speak for
the company.
<15> The

above analysis assumes that Mackey’s statements on the Yahoo! message

board were not public disclosures in and of themselves. However, the SEC may well
find that Mackey’s Web postings meet the definition of public disclosure for
purposes of satisfying Regulation FD. 56 Regulation FD states that public disclosure
is accomplished by either: (1) furnishing or filing a Form 8-K with the Commission;
or (2) “disseminating the information through another method (or combination of
methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, nonexclusionary distribution of the information to the public.” 57 Since the public has
unrestricted access to the financial message board where Mackey posted, this
method of disseminating information might be interpreted as providing “broad, nonexclusionary distribution of the information to the public” under clause (2) of the
public disclosure definition set forth by Regulation FD. 58

FUTURE OF SECURITIES LAWS AND SOCK PUPPETING
<16> Currently,

the law remains somewhat unclear regarding the repercussions of

sock puppeting. If Mackey is held to have violated the Securities Exchange Act or
Regulation FD,

59

there may be implications for cases that arise in the future. The

publicity that Mackey’s case has already generated could mean that an SEC
clarification that §10b-5 is applicable to sock puppeting will effectively eliminate the
practice entirely. Even in the absence of a formal condemnation of sock puppeting
by the SEC, corporations are likely to amend company policies and begin holding
executives accountable for this and similar practices. Although Whole Foods recently
announced that it had completed its internal investigation and would continue to
support Mackey, 60 a change to Whole Foods’ Code of Conduct has already been
made: as of November 2, 2007, executives are explicitly banned from making
anonymous or pseudonymous posts. 61 Whole Foods has made it clear that a
violation of the amended code of conduct qualifies as grounds for dismissal. 62
Other companies have recently amended their policies as well, although most of the
updated codes are less strict than that of Whole Foods, the specificity of which
some believe to be “an overreaction.” 63 Companies like Hewlett Packard and
Microsoft have kept their policies regarding blogs and online postings broad by
containing only general prohibitions against posting material information that would
cause financial harm to the company or violate securities laws. 64 Microsoft’s trust
in the judgment of its employees is revealed through the company’s code of
conduct, which, according to securities analyst Josh Bernoff, can be summed up by
a single sentence: “Don't be stupid.” 65

CONCLUSION
<17> Sock

puppeting as a practice among high-powered corporate executives is

unlikely to persist unregulated much longer.66 Whether this practice will be
regulated through anti-fraud provisions, selective disclosure provisions, or simply by
company policy has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the SEC has made it clear
through its recent investigations that pseudonymous posters can and will be held
accountable for any false comments or misstatements made in violation of securities
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laws. 67 The illusion of the Internet as a Mecca of anonymity can be a risky belief to
maintain. Sock puppeteers’ carefree posting days appear to be numbered.

PRACTICE POINTERS
Corporate leaders should be advised to resist the temptation to make
pseudonymous posts on message boards—they could face liability if the
postings affect securities markets or investor decisions.
Acceptable practice: blogging with full disclosure of true identity on a
company Web site.
Unacceptable practice: making anonymous or pseudonymous posts that
could be viewed by investors as containing inside information, or that
contain false statements, misstatements, or overly optimistic forwardlooking statements in a knowing or reckless attempt to manipulate a
company’s stocks.
<< Top
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